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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
Appellant agrees with Respondent that the cross-appeal need only be addressed if the

Court reverses the order granting summary judgment in favor of Spudnik Equipment
("Spudnik").
B.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
Appellant relies on the statement of facts and course of proceedings set out m its

Appellant's Brief.
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Respondent's characterization of the Appellant's issues on appeal 1s needlessly
argumentative and misleading because it presupposes that Appellant did not raise a material
issue of fact, when that is one of the issues raised on appeal.
Spudnik's statement of the third issue is also misleading by assuming certain issues that
first must be addressed by this Court. As the Cross-Respondent, Liberty Northwest Insurance Co.
("Liberty Northwest") restates Spudnik's third issue on appeal as:
III.

(a) Is the doctrine of spoliation relevant to a defective design case; and, (b) if so,
does the doctrine of spoliation extend to a party that does not have control or
possession over particular evidence; and, (c) if so, should the doctrine be
expanded to allow dismissal of such party's cause( s) of action; and, (d) if so,
should dismissal be permitted without showing that the alleged spoliation was
in ten tional?
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III. ARGUMENT AS TO SPUDNIK'S RESPONSE.
A.

LIBERTY PRODUCED EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE PRODUCT LIABILITY
CLAIMS.
1.

The Uncontroverted Evidence Is That The Equipment \Vas .Manufactured bv
Spudnik.

Spudnik argues that "[t]here is no evidence provmg that Spudnik Equipment
manufactured the 'conveyor system' involved in the accident." Brief of Respondent/Cross-

Appellant, p. 30. Actually, the record is quite clear that the equipment was manufactured by
Spudnik. Mr. Olmos' direct supervisor, Gerardo Saucedo, specifically testified that the
conveyors were Spudnik conveyors, to-wit:
Q.

Gerardo, the other-the conveyors that were being used
that day, were they Spudnik conveyors?

A.

Yes.

Q.

There weren't any L&L conveyors there that day?

A.

No.

R. 363-64 (Saucedo Depo., p. 32, L. 21 - p. 33). Duane Grant, the owner of Grant 4-D Farms

where Mr. Olmos was employed, testified that in 2008 the Farm kept its Spudnik conveyors
"isolated" from its L&L manufactured conveyors because the two brands could not be easily
hooked together, and were only used together in the event of "emergencies." R. 478 (Grant
Depo., p. 65, L. 18 - p. 66, L. 15). He further stated that: "My recollection is the conveyor
system that was being used in this case was all Spudnik." R. 478 (Grant Depo., p. 66, LL 18-19).

See also R. 191 (investigator identified the conveyor tables as manufactured by Spudnik and
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purchased at a farm action in March 2005 from the farm of Young & Young). The invoices for
the conveyors show that they were sold by Spudnik to Grant 4-D Farms. R. 348-349 and
Augmented Record. See also R. 210 (Miller Depo., p. 13, L. 23-24; p. 15, L. 16 - p. 16, L. 6)
and R. 212 (Miller Depo., p. 23, LL 15-18) (testifying that conveyors were bought through
Dennis Schumacher, Grant Farms contact at Spudnik). Notwithstanding taking depositions from
six (6) witnesses and Liberty's expert, Dr. Gill, see R. 3

5, Spudnik did not find or introduce

any evidence to the contrary. There is no question but that the conveyor system was
manufactured by Spudnik.
Spudnik suggests that because Liberty cannot "identify" all of the conveyors involved by
their serial number, this makes it impossible to conclude that the conveyors were manufactured
by Spudnik. Spudnik has not referenced any Idaho case law requiring this level of specificity.
Other courts have not required serial numbers before acknowledging that a product was
manufactured by a particular company. See, e.g., Smith v. Ariens Co., 377 N.E.2d 954, 956
(Mass. 1978) (allowing identification of the manufacturer by the logo); Lenharr v. NRM Corp.,
504 F.Supp. 165 (D. Kansas 1980) (identity of manufacturer established by circumstantial
evidence); Jacques v. Montana Nat'/ Guard, 649 P .2d 1319, 1323-24 (Mont. 1982) (same). r;;_:L_
Kesler v. Joe Hornstein, Inc., 207 A.D.2d 278, 279, 615 N.Y.S.2d 388, 389 (1994) (testimony
of third party witness sufficient to prove that defendant did not manufacture defective projection
bulb). Certainly, this is not a case where no one could identify the manufacturer. See, e.g.
Schmidt v. Archer Iron Works, Inc., 256 N.E.2d 6, 8 (Ill. 1970) (plaintiff could not identify
manufacturer of defective pin); Cummins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 495 A.2d 963, 967
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(Pa. Super. 1985) (plaintiff could not identify what product-a tire or rim-failed or which of
several possible manufacturers manufactured the rims).
In this case, two third-party witnesses-including the work supervisor present at the time
of the incident-testified that the equipment was manufactured by Spudnik. The uncontroverted
evidence is that the equipment was purchased from Spudnik. Spudnik has offered nothing to
refute this testimony. Consequently, the uncontroverted evidence is that Spudnik was the
manufacturer and seller of the equipment that caused Mr. Olmos' injury.
2.

The Uncontroverted Evidence Is That The Equipment Was Defectively
Designed.

Spudnik contends that Liberty cannot identify evidence that the conveyor system was
defective, arguing that evidence of a defect can only be established by examining all pieces of
equipment in use at the time of the incident. 1 (Spudnik again ignores the fact that one of the
conveyor tables was identified by serial number, and that there were only a limited number of
tables that could have been involved in this incident, any and all of which Spudnik could have
inspected if it had chosen to do so).

R. 113-116.

Spudnik's argument might make sense if the defect was based on something breaking or
not functioning as intended-i.e., a mechanical or manufacturing defect. However, that is not the
issue here. Rather, the issue is that the equipment lacked guards or other devices to protect
against a farm worker, such as Mr. Olmos, getting his hand pulled into the junction between two
1

Liberty objects to Spudnik's argument to the extent that Spudnik is arguing that Dr. Gill's
testimony was somehow inadmissible. This was not an issue raised before the District Court, and
Spudnik cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. Dunlap v. State, 146 Idaho 197, 201, 192
P.3d 1021, 1025 (2008).

APPELLANT'S REPLY/CROSS RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 4

conveyors, or adequately warning of the danger. See generally R. 384, 391-92. These are issues
common to all conveyor tables manufactured by Spudnik, not just the two that actually crushed
Mr. Olmos' hand.
The absence of guards or other protective devices or adequate warnmgs is not
"hypothetical," as Spudnik argues. Dr. Gill reviewed video, photographs, and Spudnik's own
documentation on the conveyors, which more than adequately demonstrated the absence of the
guards and warnings. See R. 384 (Gill Depo., p. 38, LL 10-12). C.{, Rodgers v. Shave Mfg. Co.

Inc., 993 F.Supp. 1428, 1433 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (admitting expert testimony on defective design
of post-hole digger where expert had inspected photographs, pleadings, affidavits and
depositions); Thomas v. Perry Mfg., Inc., 539 So.2d 2 (Fla. App. 1989) (allowing defective
design case to proceed against the manufacturer of a scaffold, although the scaffold was missing,
because the plaintiff's expert had been able to examine photographs taken of the scaffold shortly
after the accident as well as the manufacturer's specifications). Duane Grant also testified that
Spudnik's equipment did not come with guards. R. 478 (Grant Depo. P. 64, LL 23-25). Spudnik
did not offer any evidence that it had manufactured its conveyors with guards or other protective
devices, or the necessary warnings.
Spudnik references testimony from Mr. Miller purporting to state that the machinery was
not defective. Mr. Miller was not present at the time of the accident. R. 213 (Miller Depo., p. 39,
LI. 7-8). There is nothing in the record to indicate that Mr. Miller is qualified to provide an
expert opinion on whether the equipment was defective. Nevertheless, a review of Mr. Miller's
testimony shows that he was discussing a mechanical malfunction.
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Q. BY MR. BOWER: Do you believe the conveyor was
defective?
A No.
MR. PAPPAS: Object to the extent the term "defective" is vague.
Q. BY MR. BOWER: What's your understanding of the term
"defective"?

A Yeah. I don't know. If it operated properly, it would not be
defective.

R. 213 (Miller Depo., p. 39, L. 19

p. 40, L. 2). That Grant Farms believed that the equipment

was defective-at least as to the absence of guards-is demonstrated by the fact that, after Mr.
Olmos injury and a second, similar accident, the Farm subsequently devised and installed its own
"shielding mechanism that we believe will make it more difficult to gain access to the junction
between the two conveyors." R. 478 (Grant Depo., p. 64, LL 5-7 and 15-19).
Spudnik's contention is also not supported by the decisions in other jurisdictions. In
Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota 1Wotor Corp., 937 F.Supp. 134 (D. Puerto Rico 1996), the court

rejected a motion for dismissal for spoliation based on contentions similar to those raised by
Spudnik, reasoning:
TMC has filed a motion to dismiss, based on the contention that
the plaintiffs intentional or merely negligent spoliation of the
evidence deprived TMC of an adequate opportunity to defend
itself. TMC's motion might have been successful if the plaintiffs
claim were based on a defect in manufacturing, for such a claim
would require an inspection and evaluation of the specific item that
caused the injury. Instead, in the case at hand, the plaintiffs claim
is based on an alleged design defect, which, by definition, would
be found in the entire production run of the vehicle model in
question. The proof or refutation of such a claim may be
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sufficiently supported with evidence as to other, identical vehicles.
Id. at 136 (italics in original). Similarly, in Donohoe v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157
F.R.D. 238 (M.D. Penn. 1994), the court held that examination and disassembly of a seatbelt
mechanism did not constitute spoliation of evidence, but further noted that "Plaintiffs theory of
recovery by itself significantly lessens the importance of the Donohoe belt. Since she is
proceeding on a theory of design defect only, any other belt of the same model will possess the
same inherent defect and can be tested and examined for defects in the same manner as the

N.Y.S.2d 263, 265 (2006) (allowing defective design case to proceed, even though product had
been lost, because the plaintiffs expert had examined exemplar); Schroader v. Dept. of
Transportation, 710 A.2d 23, 28 (Penn. 1998) (rejecting spoliation argument where defective
vehicle had been sold, reasoning that because the claim was based "upon a design defect
common to all trucks of its kind," the defendant could "comparably test and examine other trucks
for the alleged design defect."); Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79-80 (3rd
Cir. 1994) (reversing judgment as a matter oflaw for "spoliation" because the case represented a
design defect case).
In short, Dr. Gill detailed the shortcomings in the design, including the lack of physical
guards, and warnings provided with the conveyor tables. These were plain from the video,
photographs, manufacturer's manuals, and other evidence considered by Dr. Gill. Mr. Grant's
testimony is unequivocal that Spudnik conveyors did not have guards installed. Spudnik never
offered any testimony that the equipment was manufactured or sold to Grant Fanns with the
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safety features or warnings that Dr. Gill stated were missing. Accordingly, the District Court
should have denied Spudnik's motion for summary judgment and, instead, granted summary
judgment to Liberty.

3.

The Evidence Shows That The Defects Were Present When Sold By Spudnik.

The uncontroverted testimony is that conveyors were defectively designed and lacked
adequate warnings. Dr. Gill testified that the hazard was caused by the "nip point"-the close
proximity of two turning belts. R. 384-85 (Gill Depa., p. 39, L. 7 - p. 40, L. 7). He noted that it
is not an open and obvious hazard. R. 386 (Gill Depo., p. 44, LL 5-18; p. 45, LL 22-25) and 38788 (Gill Depo., p. 51, L. 23 - p. 52, L. 4). Dr. Gill determined, however, that the equipment was
defective because it did not protect against inadvertent contact with the belts at the nip point. R.
388 (Gill Depo., p. 55, LL 7-14). Dr. Gill noted several design features that might have
eliminated or mitigated the defect, including use of a kill switch and guarding. R. 388-89 (Gill
Depa., p. 53, L. 16 - p. 55, L. 6). See also R. 387 (Gill Depo., p. 48, L. 5 - p. 50, L. 17)
(addressing other alternative designs). He also testified that the design of the conveyors violated
industry standards on the use of guards and safety features for where conveyors are connected
and joined. R. 391-92 (Gill Depo., p. 67, L. 20-p. 68, L. 11).
These defects were present when the equipment was manufactured and sold by Spudnik.
Dr. Gill testified that the nip point hazard "was created back in the design of this equipment and
this was the hazard actually being realized in realtime [sic] was when the two conveyor[s] were
counter-rotating coming into each other." R. 392 (Gill Depo., p. 392, LL 12-16). Mr. Grant, who
was familiar with Spudnik's equipment, also testified that the Spudnik conveyors did not come
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with guards, nor was he aware of Spudnik offering guards. R. 478 (Grant Depa. P. 64, Ll. 2325).
Dr. Gill also testified that there were no labels or warnings of the nip point hazard, also in
violation of industry standards. R. 384 (Gill Depa., p. 38, L. 1 - p. 39, L. 10) and R. 391 (p. 66,
L. 19 - p. 67, L. 1). His knowledge was gained from the video of the equipment, the

photographs, "and the Spudnik manual because the manual tells you what warning labels are on
the equipment and there's none for that." R. 384 (Gill Depa., p. 38, LL 10-12). Dr. Gill also
noted that manual does not discuss or warn about the nip point hazard, stating:
I just looked at the manual and in general the manual is not very
good from a safety perspective and one of the things that is
particularly relevant here is they really don't alert you to this
potential in-running nip point. Not only is it not in the safety
section, it's not back where it should be in an imbedded warning
and the manual tells you it's going to do that. In the safety section
it says when things occur that are relevant for safe operation
include your safety, health, and well-being we're going to put the
safety alert symbol in the manual for you, the triangle with the
exclamation point, but it's not there.
R. 391 (Gill Depa., p. 67, LL 4-14).

Spudnik complains that "there are no records regarding modifications, repairs or
alterations made to the conveyors before or after they were purchased by Grant 4-D farms." This
is nothing more than a red herring. Dr. Gill testified that "the condition of the equipment was not
proximate" to the incident. R. 383-84 (Gill Depa., p. 35, L. 22 - p. 36, L. 16). Spudnik has not
offered any expert testimony to explain why the condition of the equipment would have had an
impact on Spudnik's decision years earlier to not include safety features or warnings.
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Spudnik contends that Liberty is under a "faulty assumption [ ] that all Spudnik
Equipment conveyors use three-phase electricity, that all Spudnik Equipment conveyors are
wired the same, or that the conveyors involved in the accident even had the possibility of
reversing directions at the time they left Spudnik Equipment's manufacturing facility." In
actuality, it is Spudnik that asks the Court to engage in speculation.
Spudnik thinks it is significant that conveyors can be purchased with different electrical
connections and motors. However, the fact that someone could buy a conveyor with a singlephase motor does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that Grant Farms had done so. Dr. Gill
testified that the motors on the conveyors require a lot of torque and use high-voltage three-phase
motors. R. 382 (Gill Depo., p. 31, LI. 10-15). Mr. Grant testified that the conveyors operated on
three phase power. R. 469 (Grant Depo., p. 30, LI. 22-25). He explained at length about the
three-phase power system and why a motor could turn one direction or another if the line of
conveyor tables are shortened or extended. See R. 471-73 (Grant Depo. pp. 39-44). Mr. Grant
also noted that it was a common problem and was common knowledge within the industry. R.
473 (Grant Depo., p. 44, LL 19-23). See also R. 221 (Alvarez Depo., p. 66, L. 23

p. 67, L. 2)

(noting the issue of starting up and turning a different direction); Spudnik has not pointed to any
testimony in the record indicating that Grant Farms purchased the conveyors with single phase
motors and later switched the subject conveyors from single-phase to three-phase motors. More
importantly, Spudnik has not provided any evidence that the conveyor, as designed, could not
switch direction when pulled out of the line or inserted into the line.
Spudnik suggests that "[t]here is simply no way to tell whether the conveyors had been
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reconfigured or rewired by a prior owner or even what the make-up of the conveyor system was
on the day it left the control of Spudnik Equipment." Liberty disagrees. The record of sale of the
conveyors is part of the record. R. 348-349 and Augmented Record. Spudnik could have
reviewed the serial numbers and determined whether the conveyors were manufactured with
single phase motors. Mr. Miller also testified that, prior to Grant Farms purchasing the
conveyors, he had spoken with Spudnik's representative, Dennis Schumacher, about the
condition of the equipment, and that Mr. Schumacher had described the general condition of the
equipment and what he thought of them. Thus, Spudnik could have introduced testimony or
records from Mr. Schumacher's inspection of the equipment. Finally, Spudnik could have
introduced expert evidence that, absent modification, it would have been impossible for the
motors to tum a different direction. It is significant that there is no such testimony or evidence.
The record also indicates that any modifications made by Grant 4-G Farms were after Mr.
Olmos' injury. The guards developed by the Farm were not installed until after a similar incident
in 2010. R. 478 (Grant Depo., p. 64, Ll. 5-19). The adapters to allow the Farm to use L&L
conveyors with Spudnik conveyors, and different models of Spudnik conveyors together, where
not installed until the winter of 2009. R. 475 (Grant Depo., p. 54, LL 1-4); R. 478 (Grant Depo.,
p. 65, LL 21-25). The phase reversers that the Farm eventually installed, to allow the direction of
the motors to be changed, were not installed until the winter of 2009-over a year after Mr.
Olmos' injury. See R. 478 (Grant Depo., p. 66, LL 24-25). While some of the phase reversers
(i.e., directional switches) were already installed when the Farm purchased the conveyors, Mr.
Grant believed that the switches had been installed by Spudnik. See R. 475 (Grant Depo., p. 55,
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LL 7-14). Mr. Grant testified that the Farm had modified the plugs on the conveyors so they are
uniform, but the testimony does not indicate when the modifications took place. See R. 475
(Grant Depo., p. 54, L. 17 - p. 55, L. 6). See also R. 191 (investigator's report indicating that
there were no modifications to the conveyor table); R. 427 (Groat Depo., p. 44, L. 21 -p. 45, L.
13).
In short, the uncontroverted evidence is that the conveyors were defectively designed and
lacked adequate warnings, which defects and omissions are what caused Mr. Olmos' injury.
4.

The Defects and Warnings Were the Proximate Cause of the Accident.

Spudnik argues that Liberty cannot offer evidence of proximate cause because it cannot
identify the particular conveyors and, therefore, cannot identify the particular defect that lead to
the accident. Spudnik's argument is specious for two reasons. First, one of the conveyors
involved was identified by serial number, and there were only a limited number of other possible
conveyors that could have been involved. This is not an issue of an inability to examine the
conveyors, it is an issue of a lack of effort by Spudnik to do so.
Second, as discussed in much greater detail above, the defect alleged is a design defect
and a lack of warnings. Dr. Gill testified at length and in detail of what types of safety features
were absent from the conveyor, why they were important, and that their absence led to Mr.
Olmos' injury. Spudnik had done nothing to refute this-it has not offered testimony that it
designed and manufactured its products with any of the safety features recommended by Dr. Gill.
In fact, the testimony is clear that there were no warnings on the machine or in the manual about
a possible nip point hazard, nor any guards or other safety devices to prevent someone like Mr.
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Olmos from getting their hand caught in the nip points. Consequently, given the unrefuted
evidence, this Court should reverse the decision of the District Court, and remand with
instructions that the District Court grant summary judgment to Liberty.

5.

Age and Disability Did Not Cause This Accident.
2

Spudnik stoops to blaming Mr. Olmos' age and (alleged) disabilities for his accident. Dr.
Gill testified that farm workers that were elderly and/or had disabilities were part of the
foreseeable user group for this type of equipment. R. 379 (Gill Depo., p. 18, L. 15 - p. 19, L.
19). Dr. Gill stated that why Mr. Olmos had his hand on or near the nip point was not relevant to
his analysis that the equipment was defectively designed. R. 393 (Gill Depo., p. 72, LL 3-19).
Dr. Gill further stated that "[i]n this case, [']is it foreseeable that someone's hands would be
inside[?'] and the answer is not only is it foreseeable, that's the nature of the tasks they perform,
is putting their hands inside the rails and on to the area where the conveyor belt is." R. 393 (Gill
Depo., p. 73, LL 8-12). In short, it was foreseeable that older and/or disabled workers would be
employed to pick clods and debris from the potatoes on the conveyor. Spudnik's argument is
essentially a concession that the equipment was defective and unreasonable hazardous.
Spudnik also returns to its mantra about "failing to preserve" the equipment that is still
present and being used at Grant Farms. As explained above, it is irrelevant. As the designer and
manufacturer, if Spudnik manufactured equipment with any of the safety features and warnings
that Dr. Gill discussed, such as the guards that Grant Farms itself subsequently made and
2

It is notable that George Olmos, Mr. Olmos' son, denied that Mr. Olmos had any mental
problems, and disclaimed that it was a mistake for his father to work on the conveyor belts. R.
249 (Olmos Depo., p. 42, LL 1-16) and R. 251 (Olmos Depo., p. 71, LL 12-15).
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installed, Spudnik could have easily submitted such evidence. There is no evidence from an
expert refuting any of Dr. Gill's conclusions.

B.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A FAILURE TO WARN.
Spudnik argues that the inability to identify the conveyors as dispositive to the issue

whether Liberty can meet its burden as to the claim of a failure to warn. As discussed above,
there is no doubt but that the conveyors involved were all manufactured by Spudnik. See R. 36364 (Saucedo Depo., p. 32, L. 21 - p. 33); R. 478 (Grant Depo., p. 65, L. 18 - p. 66, L. 19). See
also R. 191 (investigator identified the conveyor tables as manufactured by Spudnik and

purchased at a farm action in March 2005 from the farm of Young & Young); R. 348-349 and
Augmented Record.; R. 210 (Miller Depo., p. 13, L. 23-24; p. 15, L. 16 - p. 16, L. 6) and R.
212 (Miller Depo., p. 23, LL 15-18). Dr. Gill reviewed photographs and videos of the conveyors
and, because they list all of the warning labels on the machines, Spudnik's manuals. There were
no warnings of a possible nip point hazard, either on the machines or discussed in the manual. R.
384 (Gill Depo., p. 38, LL 10-12); R. 391 (Gill Depo., p. 67, LL 4-14). Spudnik has not presented
any evidence that the manual was incorrect, or its product actually shipped with warnings. Thus,
the Court should reverse the decision of the District Court and remand with instructions that the
District Court enter summary judgment for Liberty.
C.

WARRANTY CLAIMS.
Liberty is not challenging the District Court's decision as to the warranty issues.
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IV. LIBERTY'S RESPONSE TO SPUDNIK'S CROSS-APPEAL
A.

THERE WAS NO SPOLIATION BY LIBERTY.
One of the basic flaws in Spudnik's argument is that Liberty did not destroy any of the

evidence. "The doctrine of spoliation of evidence 'provides that when a party with a duty to
preserve evidence intentionally destroys it, an inference arises that the destroyed evidence was
unfavorable to that party." Ada County Highway Dist. V. Total Success lnvs., LLC, 145 Idaho
360, 368, 179 P.3d 323, 331 (2008) (quoting Courtney v. Big 0 Tires, Inc., 139 Idaho 821, 824,
87 P.3d 930, 933 (2003)).
It is uncontroverted that the conveyors involved were owned by Grant 4 D Farms at the

time of the incident. See R. 191; R. 348-349 and Augmented Record (invoices for conveyors).

See also R. 210 (Miller Depo., p. 13, L. 23-24; p. 15, L. 16 - p. 16, L. 6) and R. 212 (Miller
Depo., p. 23, LL 15-18) (testifying that Grant 4 D Farms had purchased the conveyors through
Dennis Schumacher, Grant Farms contact at Spudnik).
The incident and injury occurred on October 9, 2010 (i.e., a Thursday). R. 190. However,
it was not reported to Liberty until the weekend. R. 442-433 (Groat Depo., p. 107, L. 25 -p. 108,

L. 3 ). Mr. Groat, the Liberty investigator, received notice on October 13, 2010 (i.e., the
following Monday). R. 426 (Groat Depo., p. 41, LL 11-12). Mr. Groat spoke to Mr. Grant on the
13th to set up an appointment to conduct his investigation. At that time, Mr. Grant told Mr. Groat
that the farm had continued to use the equipment. R. 424 (Groat Depo., p. 32, L. 17 - p. 33, L.
4), R. 442 (Groat Depo., p. 106, LL 11-25; p. 107, L. 5-16). See also R. 470 (Grant Depo., p. 32,
LL 8-11) (testifying that the farm continued to use the conveyors).
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Because of prior appointments, Mr. Groat was unable to get to the farm until October 15,
2008. R. 424 (Groat Depo., p. 33, LL 5-9). Mr. Groat also returned on October 20, 2008, to
conduct further investigation. R. 423 (Groat Depo., p. 30, LL 6-13; p. 31, LL 8-20).
Mr. Groat noted that if there had been a machinery breakdown or malfunction, he
normally would have requested the insured to "secure" the machinery. R. 442 (Groat Depo., p.
104, L. 8

105, L. 12). But Mr. Groat's understanding from Mr. Grant was that the accident

was the result of a mishap, not a malfunction of the machinery; he treated the investigation as a
worker's compensation injury; and Mr. Groat did not conclude from his investigation that there
had been a malfunction or breakdown of the machinery. R. 442 (Groat Depo., p. 106, LL 1-20; p.
107, p. 8-10), R. 443 (Groat Depo., p. 109, L. 9- p. 110, L. 22).
There were only 6 conveyor tables purchased. See R. 348-349 and Augmented Record
(invoices for conveyors). One of the tables involved in the accident was specifically identified by
its serial number. R. 191. There is no evidence or indication that any of the tables have been
sold.
In sum, Liberty did not possess or control the conveyor tables. The tables continued to be
used, including being moved around, after Mr. Olmos' accident, even prior to Liberty being
notified of the accident. Liberty's investigator did not believe that there was a mechanical
breakdown or malfunction that would have prompted him to request that Grant Farms secure the
equipment. The tables are still at the farm.
Thus, the evidence is clear that Liberty was not the party that engaged in the spoliation, if
any, of the evidence. Spoliation only applies to the party connected to the loss or destruction of
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the evidence." Courtney, 139 Idaho 821, 824, 87 P.3d 930, 933 (2003). Moreover, similar to the
situation in Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165 (1999), where the plaintiffs expert
failed to examine a shotgun for evidence of mechanical defect, the conveyors are still at the farm.
To paraphrase Bromley, "[t]he evidence necessary to show whether the [conveyor was defective]
was available to [Spudnik]. The [conveyors were] not lost and [they were] not destroyed."
Bromley, 132 Idaho at 812. Finally, there is no evidence that at the time of Mr. Groat's
investigation, he was aware of the possibility of future litigation due to any alleged defects in the
design or manufacture of the equipment.
B.

LIBERTY DID NOT INTENTIONALLY DESTROY ANY EVIDENCE.
The doctrine of spoliation only applies where the party charged with destroying the

evidence did so intentionally. Ada County Highway Dist. V. Total Success lnvs., LLC, 145
Idaho 360, 368, 179 P.3d 323, 331 (2008). Here, the District Court found no evidence of
intentional conduct by Liberty in allegedly failing to preserve evidence. R. 302. Spudnik does
not challenge the District Court's findings, nor does Spudnik offer any evidence of intentional
spoliation by Liberty. Thus, Spudnik has waived any challenge to the District Court's findings.
Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 557-58, 130 P.3d 1087, 1095-96 (2006).
C.

SPUDNIK HAS FAILED TO PRESENT ANY ARGUMENT FOR EXTENSION
OR MODIFICATION OF THE LAW.
Spudnik, however, asks the court to adopt a negligence standard for spoliation, and

extending the duty and/or sanction to third parties. Spudnik does not offer any argument as to
why the Court should overrule its prior precedent on this matter.
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This issue was previously raised to and rejected by this Court in Courtney v. Big 0 Tires,

Inc., supra. In Courtney, the court noted that "[s]poliation is a rule of evidence applicable at the
discretion of the trial court." Courtney, 139 Idaho at 824. It is a form of admission by conduct.

Id. There, the plaintiff argued: (i) that the person destroying or losing the evidence has a duty to
preserve the evidence and, therefore, his or her state of mind should have no bearing on the
sanction for its loss; and (ii) the presumption should apply to all defendants, not just the
defendant who lost or destroyed the evidence. Id.
The court rejected the argument that the state of mind should be irrelevant because it was
inconsistent with spoliation being a form of admission. The court, citing McCormick on

Evidence, noted that "[b]y resorting to wrongful devices, the party is said to provide a basis for
believing that he or she things the case is weak and not to be won by fair means .... " Courtney,
139 Idaho at 824 (quoting McCormick on Evidence, 4th Ed. § 265, pp. 189-94 (1992)).
Obviously, there is no admission by conduct if the conduct was inadvertent or negligent because
"it does not sustain the inference of consciousness of a weak case." Id. The court in Courtney
also rejected the argument that spoliation should apply to innocent third parties, noting that "[a]s
an admission, the spoliation only applies to the party connected to the loss or destruction of the
evidence." Courtney, 139 Idaho at 824. The court concluded:
Whether or not conduct constitutes an admission depends upon the
party's knowledge or intent that can be inferred from that conduct.
For the loss or destruction of evidence to constitute an admission,
the circumstances must indicate that the evidence was lost or
destroyed because the party responsible for such loss or destruction
did not want the evidence available for use by an adverse party in
pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation. The merely
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negligence loss of evidence will not support the inference, nor
would the intentional destruction of an item that a party had no
reason to believe had any evidentiarv significance at the time it
was destroyed.

Courtney, 139 Idaho at 824 (underline added).
The court also considered this issue in Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 118 Idaho 224, 796
P.2d I 01 (1990), and rejected an argument calling for imposition of negligent spoliation of
evidence. Murray, 118 Idaho at 229.
Spudnik's references to Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165 (1999) and

Ricketts v. Eastern Idaho Equipment Co., 137 Idaho 578, 51P.3d392 (2002), are unavailing. In
Bromley, the court clearly indicated that spoliation arose "when a party with a duty to preserve
evidence intentionally destroys it, an inference arises that the destroyed evidence was
unfavorable to that party." Bromley, 132 Idaho at 812 (underline added). The court also
indicated that spoliation was a rule of evidence. Id. Thus, there is nothing inconsistent between

Bromley and this Court's other cases discussing spoliation.
In Ricketts v. Eastern Idaho Equipment Co., 137 Idaho 578, 51 P.3d 392 (2002), the
court noted prior Idaho cases that had discussed the tort of spoliation of evidence, but that it had
not been adopted in Idaho.

Ricketts, 137 Idaho at 581-82. However, the court indicated that

it was an intentional tort, closely aligned to the tort of intentional interference with a prospective
business advantage. Id. In Ricketts, the court did not adopt the tort, but merely noted that there
was no evidence of intent to support the claim. The Ricketts opinion cited to Cook v. State Dept.

of Trans., 133 Idaho 288, 985 P.2d 1150 (1999) and Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129
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Idaho 171, 923 P.2d 416 ( 1996). In Cook, the plaintiff has filed a suit that included a claim for
spoliation of evidence against ITD, but had failed to file a notice of tort claim. Cook, 133 Idaho
at 298. In Yoakum, the court, without adopting the tort, noted that the plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate that the defendant had willfully destroyed any evidence. Yoakum, 129 Idaho at 178.
In this case, Spudnik has not made a claim against Liberty for the tort of spoliation. See R. 27 et

seq.
In short, Spudnik has not presented any cogent argument for an extension or modification
of Idaho law to allow a sanction, especially dismissal of a case, for negligent spoliation of
evidence. None of the foregoing cases support Spudnik's argument. Consequently, the Court
should deny Spudnik's request.

D.

EVEN IF THE COURT RECOGNIZED NEGLIGENT SPOLIATION, IT IS
UNAVAILING IN THIS CASE.
There is no evidence that Liberty had a duty to prevent spoliation, breached its duty, if

any, or was the proximate cause of any prejudice to Spudnik. As noted above, the equipment was
owned by Grant Farms, not Liberty. Moreover, Liberty was not involved in the decision for the
Farm to continue to use the equipment following the accident-Liberty was not even notified for
two or three days.
There is also no evidence that Spudnik was prejudiced to any material degree. As noted
above, other courts have held that spoliation is not appropriate in a defective design case because
the parties can examine exemplars to determine if there was a problem in the design. Several of
those cases were from jurisdictions that have adopted a negligent spoliation standard.
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For instance, in Enstrom v. Garden Place Hotel, 27 A.D.3d 1084, 811 N.Y.S.2d 263,
(2006), the court noted that under New York law, spoliation sanctions may be appropriate "even
if the destruction occurred through negligence rather than willfulness, and even if the evidence
was destroyed before the spoliator became a party, provided [the party] was on notice that the
evidence might be needed for future litigation." Enstrom, 27 A.D.3d at 1086 (brackets in
original). Nevertheless, the court found that the requested sanction of striking the pleading was
unwarranted because the plaintiffs liability theory was based on defective design, and the
plaintiffs expert had been able to examine an exemplar and determine that there had been a
design defect. Id.
In Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 93 7 F .Supp. 134 (D. Puerto Rico 1996), the
court was requested to dismiss the plaintiffs pleading based on negligent spoliation. In that case,
the plaintiff alleged a defective design of air bags in a motor vehicle, but the motor vehicle had
been sold and the purchaser could not be located. Id. at 136. As discussed in more detail above,
the court rejected the request because the claim was for a design defect that could be proven or
disproven by examining other vehicles manufactured by the defendant. Id.
Both Schroader v. Dept. of Transportation, 710 A.2d 23 (Penn. 1998) and Schmid v.
~Yilwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76 (3rd Cir. 1994) held that the sanction for spoliation

depended, in part, on the culpability of the party that destroyed the evidence and the resulting
prejudice, suggesting that negligent spoliation would be considered an option. However, in both
cases, the court rejected a call for judgment against the plaintiffs for alleged spoliation because
the cases involved design defects that could be determined from an examination of the products.
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Even more significantly, Spudnik has no expert testimony that explains why it has been
prejudiced by the alleged spoliation. That is, Spudnik has not submitted expert testimony to
explain why it needs to examine the original equipment rather than examine an exemplar or rely
on its records or plans.
In short, even if this Court were to consider a negligence standard for spoliation, there is
no evidence of a duty or breach by Liberty. Certainly, there is no showing of culpability on the
part of Liberty, or prejudice to Spudnik, that would justify dismissal of Liberty's claims.
C.

NEGLIGENT SPOLIATION
EXTANT CASE LAW.

OF

EVIDENCE

IS

INCONSISTENT WITH

In considering whether to modify or extend existing law, the court should be cognizant of
its impact on other law. For instance, Idaho has long recognized that a plaintiff may prove a
product's liability claim by circumstantial evidence of a malfunction of the product, recognizing
that "evidence of a defect in a product which was present when it left the manufacturer's control
will be rare and unusual." Farmer v. Int'! Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 747, 553 P.2d 1306,
1311 (197 6). "In other words, if the plaintiff cannot prove that a specific defect cause the
accident, it will suffice if it can be shown that the product malfunctioned, and that there are no
other reasonably likely causes of the malfunction." Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 118 Idaho 224,
227, 796 P.2d 101, 104 (1990). In both Henderson v. Cominco American, Inc., 95 Idaho 690,
518 P.2d 873 (1973) and Mortensen v. Chevron Chemical Co., 107 Idaho 836, 693 P.2d 1038
(1984), the court allowed circumstantial evidence of defectively manufactured farm chemicals,
even though there is no indication in the cases that any of the chemical had been saved.
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To follow Spudnik's argument would threaten this rule ofldaho law. Certainly, ifthere is
reasonable circumstantial evidence of a defect, and there is expert testimony eliminating other
causes or misuse of the product, an injured plaintiff should not have his or her case dismissed
merely because the product is lost or destroyed through inadvertence on the part of the plaintiff
or through no fault of the plaintiff.
D.

COSTS.

Liberty asserts that it be awarded its costs of appeal as a matter of right should it be found
to be the prevailing party. I.A.R. 40. Moreover, because Spudnik's cross-appeal is unreasonable
in the face of established Idaho law, Liberty should be awarded its attorney's fees. First State
Bank of Eldorado v. Rowe, 142 Idaho 608, 615, 130 P.3d 1146, 1153 (2006); I.C. § 12-121;
I.R.C.P. 54(e); I.A.R. 11.2 and 41.
V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Liberty has properly presented admissible expert testimony and other
testimony establishing that there was a design defect. Spudnik failed to respond with admissible
expert testimony either to refute Liberty's expert or to show why it has been prejudiced by the
alleged spoliation of evidence. The evidence also shows that there was no spoliation of the
evidence; or, if there was any, it was not caused by Liberty. Consequently, the Court should
reverse the summary judgment entered by the District Court, and remand this matter with
instructions that summary judgment be entered in favor of Liberty. The Court should also award
Liberty its costs and attorney's fees on Spudnik's cross-appeal.
DATED this

zy!~ay of December, 2012.
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